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This article proceeds in three modes. The first briefly
characterizes my reactions to the Chaoulli decision in
June 2005 as a policy analyst and one of the experts in
the Quebec trial testifying on behalf of Canada's
Attorney General. The second part discusses some of
the commentaries of others in connection with this
decision. The third-and the main section-deals with
the Court majority's use of international evidence in
arriving at its decision and argues that the approach
taken violated almost every scholarly standard for
competent, cross-national policy analysis.
Cet article proc~de en trois modes. Le premier expose
bri~vement mes reactions A I'arr~t Chaoulli de juin
2005, puisque je suis analyste de politiques et figurais
parmi les experts du proc~s au QuEbec, t~moignant au
nom du Procureur g~ndral du Canada. La deuxi~me
partie d~bat de certains commentaires d'autres
observateurs en rapport avec cet arr~t. Le troisiime-
il s'agit de la section principale-aborde le recours, par
la majorit6 de [a Cour, de preuves internationales pour
arriver A son arr&, et argue que la demarche adopt~e
enfreignait quasiment toutes les normes confirm~es
permettant une analyse comp~tente et transnationale
des politiques.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Canadians hardly needed reminding in June of 2005 that the
Supreme Court's decision in Chaoulli v. Ouebec (Attorney General),'
which struck down the Quebec prohibition on private health insurance
for publicly insured services, was an important, if unexpected judgment.
The immediate reactions were numerous, strongly worded, and varied.2
As an American scholar familiar with both Canadian health debates and
the limited attention to them in the U.S. media, I was not surprised that
the controversy was hardly noted south of the Canadian border. But, as
one of the expert witnesses at the trial court level, I was certainly
surprised by the decision, initially puzzled by the majority's reasoning,
and, after an initial period of quiet reflection, literally flabbergasted by
both its misconceptions and misuse of comparative, cross-national
evidence.
The structure of this article reflects these three perspectives,
each embodying a chronological period and a different professional
role. Part II briefly characterizes my initial reactions to the Chaoulli
decision as a policy analyst familiar with medicare and with the legal and
policy disputes surrounding the case at the trial court level. Part III
reflects a second phase of reflections. It discusses some of the
commentaries of other policy and legal specialists about the character
and merits of the decision, as well as the implications for the future of
medicare in its provincial expressions. The main focus of the article,
however, is on the Court's use of comparative, cross-national evidence.
As a specialist in cross-national policy analysis, I argue in Part III and
Part IV that the majority's approach to international and comparative
'[2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 [Chaoulh].
2 See David Gratzer, "An End to the Party Line" Maclean s (20 June 2005) 22; "The Right
to Live," Editorial, National Post (9 June 2005) A20; Ingrid Peritz "Praise, Censure for MD's
Crusade" The Globe and Mail (10 June 2005) A9; L. Ian MacDonald "Canada's Youngest
Supreme Writes a Mean Judgment" Montreal Gazette (10 June 2005) A23; Sam Shortt "Ruling
Won't Improve Health Care" Ottawa Citizen (15 June 2005) A15; "Medicare on Trial.. .Again"
Winnipeg Free Press (9 June 2005) A15; Antonia Maioni & Christopher Manfredi "A Blow to
Champions of Medicare" Toronto Star (10 June 2005) A25; 'sStrong Medicine from High Court for
Health System" Edmonton Journal (10 June 2005) A16; "A Supreme Shot in the Arm: Right to
Buy Private Health Care Should be Extended Here, Too," Editorial, Calgary Herald(10 June 2005)
A22; and Barry Kay "Private Health Insurance Needn't Have a Huge Impact" Kitchener- Waterloo
Record(16 June 2005) A9.
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evidence violated almost every scholarly standard for competent policy
analysis.
II. THE CHAOULLI DECISION: INITIAL SURPRISES AND
SURMISES
The narrow 4-3 decision in Chaoulli was, for many critics of
medicare, judicial confirmation of the program's overall failure to
provide timely and proper access to health care. For medicare's
supporters, the decision represented a worrisome threat to the
program's core values, most notably the principle that access to care
should not vary with one's willingness and ability to pay for private
health insurance. On this topic, the initial reaction was fulsome,
frequent, and strongly felt.3
For external observers like myself, two issues initially struck me
as significant about the decision: the vigorous judicial participation in a
policy field that, in Canada and much of the OECD world, had typically
been reserved to legislatures; 4 and the reasoning behind the majority's
opinion that access to care was so wanting in Quebec that it violated the
province's Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.5 Writing in Time
Canada immediately after the decision, I called attention to the court's
view that neither "common sense [n]or theory"6 was the basis for the
majority's decision. I emphasized the majority's claim that "evidence"
about how other industrial democracies organize the financing of
3 By the end of the summer, the University of Toronto Press had already published a
volume of articles from a conference that substantially, but not entirely, reflected a critical
judgment of the Court's majority rulings. Colleen M. Flood, Kent Roach & Lorne Sossin, eds.,
Access to Care, Access to Justice- The Legal Debate Over Private Health Insurance in Canada
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005). This, of course, was a prelude to the Osgoode Hall
Law School conference from which many of the articles in this special issue are drawn.
See Christopher P. Manfredi & Antonia Maioni, "The Last Line of Defence for Citizens:
Litigating Private Health Insurance in Chaoulli v. Quebed' (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 249. This
article takes up both the substance and the appropriateness of this judicial "activism." Interestingly,
this article's concentration is on the questionable appropriateness of the judicial intervention, not
its substantive justification. As will be clear in this article, my argument is that the court was
entering an area it should have approached with much more caution and, most importantly, the
majority's opinion was poorly reasoned.
'R.S.Q. c. C-12 [Quebec Chartei].
6 Supra note 1 at 855.
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medical care provided the "empirical" grounds for their opinion.7 This
was the basis the majority offered for rejecting experts' conclusions at
trial that international evidence about health care financing policies did
not provide grounds for overturning the ban on private insurance for
publicly financed services. In this article, I do not want to assess the
competency of the Court in evaluating the performance of health
systems, although I do think it is a question worth exploring. Rather, in
Part IV, I directly address the way the Court actually reasoned through
the comparative evidence of the experience of other OECD nations.
The background required to question the Court's use of
comparative evidence was not central to the initial responses to the
Chaoulli decision. It is true that medicare has been unique among OECD
nations in banning what Colleen Flood usefully terms "double
coverage."8 But, for political leaders like Ralph Klein who have long
argued for more private financing and provision of medical care, the
Court's decision to challenge that ban prompted immediate approval,
not justificatory curiosity: "Any change that gives Canadians more
choice in accessing health care," he stated on 9 June 2005, was worthy.9
The President of the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), Dr. Albert
J. Schumacher, described the Court's ruling as "historical," one that
"could substantially change the very foundations of medicare as we
know it."1 But the CMA's focus was on the political consequences within
Canada, not the Court's reasoning about the experience of other
national health care programs with private insurance. For those like
former Saskatchewan premier Roy Romanow, who have long celebrated
7 Ted Marmor, "Supreme Ironies: Despite its Flaws, the Court's Ruling Could Spur
Canada to Fix Health Care" Time (Canada) 165:25 (20 June 2005) 35.
8 The terms used to describe what private health insurance had proscribed include a
misleading melange: "complementary," "supplementary," "extra," and, more usefully, "double
coverage." "Double coverage" simply means private health insurance for costs of care that are
publicly financed. What Flood makes clear, which will be important in discussing the Court's
reasoning, is that the forms of private health insurance take on significance in connection with their
overall impact on who gets what kind of care when. See Colleen M. Flood, Mark Stabile & Sasha
Kontic, "Finding Health Policy 'Arbitrary': The Evidence on Waiting, Dying, and Two-Tier
Systems" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 3, 296; Stefan GrelB, "The Role of Private Health
Insurance in Social Health Insurance Countries-Implications for Canada" ibid, 278.
9 John Cotter, "Provinces Respond to SCOC Striking Down Quebec Private Health
Insurance Law" The Canadian Press (9 June 2005) (QL).
" "Health-care Ruling Called 'Stinging Indictment"' CBC News (10 June 2005), online:
CBC News < http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/06/09/medical-ruling-
reaction050609.html >.
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medicare, the decision was a call to political action. After all, the Court
did not hold that the ban was unconstitutional itself. Instead, it argued
that the "prohibition on obtaining private health insurance ... is not
constitutional where the public system fails to deliver reasonable
services." 1
The very narrowness of the decision's grounds was crucial to
making sense of the immediate response to the decision: the fear
medicare defenders felt, the delight critics expressed, and the policy
implications experts imagined. There appeared little doubt that private
health insurance would be for sale in Quebec at some point, though
later some scholars expressed doubt. 2 But it seemed just as likely that in
other provinces the decision would prompt governmental attention to
waiting list problems on the scale of Quebec's in recent years. 13 In that
respect, the decision appeared to warrant less celebration from
advocates of private insurance and justified less fear from defenders of
medicare. Understood symbolically, it was easy to see why the
ideological stakes initially seemed so high on both sides. Such was my
impression in the immediate aftermath of the decision.
III. FURTHER REFLECTIONS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE
The range of reactions to the Chaoulli decision has been
extraordinarily broad among scholars interested in Canadian medicare.
Both the University of Toronto Faculty of Law's conference entitled
"Access to Care, Access to Justice: The Legal Debate Over Private
Health Care in Canada" that took place in September of 2005, and
Osgoode Hall Law School's one-day national summit entitled "Chaoulli
11 Supra note 1 at 860.
12 For example, there had been initial skepticism from some Quebec lawyers in the Fall of
2005. As communicated to me personally by Antonia Maioni via email, the Quebec government
"finally responded to Chaoulli and proposed to allow private insurance and this is now ONLY for
elective surgery in hip, knee, and cataract [cases]; and the opening of a limited number of 'public-
private partnerships' in these same three services in which publicly affiliated doctors would perform
surgeries covered by public insurance (so the wall between physicians in the public system and those
who opt out of it remains in place). Quebec also intends to put into place "wait time guarantees"
for certain services." Email from Antonia Maioni to Theodore R. Marinor (28 February 2006) [on
file with the author].
' See e.g. Alan Maynard, "How to Defend a Public Health Care System: Lessons from
Abroad" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 3, 237.
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and the Restructuring of Health Care in Canada" that took place in
October of 2005, displayed not only different ideological sympathies
with the decision itself, but hugely different interpretations of what was
important to assert. Some thought the decision, whatever its merits,
might prompt useful attention to waiting lists and other measures of
distress, as already noted.14 Other commentators were preoccupied with
the privileges the decision could provide to higher-income Canadians, or
how these high-income earners pursued such avenues of advantage in
the years preceding Chaoulli Still others raised different issues, all of
which are of interest, but which exceed the scope of this article.15
For this article, the Court's use of evidence from other systems
of publicly financed medical care is central. My conclusion, after more
careful review, is that the majority's treatment of international evidence
was conceptually flawed, empirically superficial, and profoundly
misleading. These are strong claims and obviously require elaboration
and documentation.
16
The majority contended that the experience of other countries
with supplementary insurance "refutes the government's theory that a
prohibition on private health insurance is connected to maintaining
quality public health care."' 7 The Court went on to state that "[i]t does
not appear that private participation leads to the eventual demise of
public health care."18 The first of these claims, I will try to demonstrate,
is clearly misleading. The second is true, but relevant to a question the
trial court rightly did not ask. Every Western European nation with
universal or near universal medical care coverage permits private health
insurance. That generalization is one no expert in comparative medical
care policy would (or did before the trial court) deny.
The misleading conclusions the Court reached were connected
to the way the majority framed the question for which international
evidence might be relevant. The pressing question in Chaoulli was
14 ibid.
''See generally Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 3.
"'There is still a strong body of evidence about the distributive effects and inefficiencies of
private insurance and clear evidence from places like the United Kingdom and New Zealand that
eliminating monopoly in public insurance will not eliminate waiting lists. See Flood, Stabile &
Kontic, supra note 8 at 298.
" Supra note 1 at 794.
18 Ibid.
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neither whether private health insurance practices exist nor whether the
health programs of the OECD world manage to produce tolerable results
despite these practices. The question, rather, was whether expanding
private insurance-understood as double coverage-fosters higher
quality of care for the public programs, increases citizen support for the
national scheme, or helps in dealing with the inflationary forces in
medical care. But for one witness, there was agreement among the
experts that private health insurance does not aid these purposes! 9
Nonetheless, what strikes the outside policy analyst is the
peculiarity of the question. Why would anyone sensibly defend or
critique the Canadian ban on supplementary coverage on the basis that
public programs would otherwise fail to provide a reasonable level of
quality or fail to engender political support? Who among the
comparative experts consulted claimed that allowing double coverage
would lead to such extreme (and extremely unhappy) outcomes? None
in fact did. In fact, no scholar I know of would claim that national health
financing is incompatible with supplementary private health insurance.
The defensible justification of the ban on supplementary health
insurance in Canada is egalitarian and prudent. Parallel financing,
ample research has shown, tends to increase overall costs.2" Moreover,
the experience of private supplementary insurance in Europe is that
parallel financing persistently raises questions of fairness, as illustrated
by the controversies over pay-beds in British National Health Service
(NHS) hospitals; private insurance coverage of co-payments in France;
and the exiting from the public insurance "pool" of those in Germany's
top 10 per cent of income earners."' These problematic features of
double coverage are known to scholars of health care, yet they were not
noted by the majority. The scholarly findings suggest prudent lessons
from other countries, not stories of policy collapse from supplementary
1It is a feature of systems with greater levels of private finance that they are more often in
turmoil. See Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Colleen M. Flood & Mark Stabile, "How Does Private
Finance Affect Public Health Care Systems? Marshaling the Evidence from OECD Nations" (2004)
29 J. Health Pol. 359.
2 Indeed, the Court cited the article by Tuohy, Flood & Stabile ibid., but failed to note this
as part of its findings.
' For the NHS, see especially Rudolf Klein, The New Politics of the National Health
Service, 3d ed. (New York: Longman, 1995). For French and German discussions, the writings of
Jean de Kervasdoue and Heinz Rothgang are useful sources. Conversations with these scholars
during the fall of 2005 brought out the persistence of these concerns. But, see especially the support
for these claims in Maynard, supra note 13; Grel3, supra note 8.
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coverage. Evaluating Canada's ban thus calls for judgment about what is
more fair and less costly, not what is simply possible to do.
The majority posed the wrong questions, I believe, when dealing
with comparative evidence. As a result, they were unable to legitimately
reject the twin arguments that if ability and willingness to pay is a
criterion of access, parallel systems increase costs and allocate access to
care unfairly. What is even more puzzling is that the majority was willing
to reject the decisions of two Quebec courts in a major case that but for
one vote would have gone the other way. On this reading, one ought to
be concerned with this kind of judicial expansion of both claimed
expertise and vigour amidst substantial disagreement.
It may be that the problems of the Chaoulli decision for
medicare defenders were the arguments the government's lawyers
offered, not the merits of the case for banning supplementary
coverage." To the extent the government justified its defence by threats
of medicare's demise or its loss of quality, it made a serious mistake.
There was and is no reason to believe that parallel systems cannot
maintain adequate quality, prevent runaway inflation, or survive in
recognizable form.23 But that does not mean the ban on supplementary
insurance in Quebec was unjustified: it was justified on grounds of
advancing equality of access and helping to maintain broad interest in
the quality of care available to most Quebec citizens.
The central policy point to make about parallel health insurance
is rather simple: such systems are likely to be more expensive overall,
.are certain to be less fair, and alone will not do very much about the
length of waiting lists. After all, "[w]here will the specialists and
physicians come from to staff a privately paid tier if notfrom the public
sector? The majority does not address this fundamental question."24 If
22 It no doubt should be stipulated that the parallel financing that is the subject of my
article is supplementary, private insurance to finance costs in services covered by the public plans,
whether in Canada or elsewhere-what Flood terms "double coverage." See Flood, Stabile &
Kontic, supra note 8.
' The United Kingdom has had queue-jumping through private insurance since 1948, but
the NHS remains primarily a place where care is free at the point of service, and the overwhelming
proportion of the population relies on it for care. That the British government is today trying to
"purchase" care from private suppliers from Europe and the United States is itself worthy of
attention. The official justification of that policy is the attempt to reduce the capacity of the
privately insured to gain unfair advantage. More access on NHS medical grounds will, according to
this view, reduce the ability of the wealthier to "jump the queue."
2 4Flood, Stabile & Kontic, supra note 8 at 310.
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Dr. Chaoulli is serving a privately financed patient, he can not at the
same time treat a publicly financed one. This point, so obvious to the
outsider, has prompted less immediate attention than I would have
expected.25
If this point was clarified, it would produce greater
understanding about why restricting private coverage is an expression of
firm and important Canadian beliefs about how access to care ought to
be provided.26 And, as a consequence, the Court's decision would be a
landmark one in a quite different sense.
IV. FINAL THOUGHTS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE
As mentioned, the first part of this article conveys what I had
written within hours of reading the decision.2 ' But in the following
weeks, there was literally a deluge of commentary among critics,
defenders, and explicators of the Chaoulli decision. Those
commentaries prompted further attention to two questions: (1) why
introducing private funding and delivery might not reduce waiting lists
(and times); and (2) precisely what was wrong with the majority's
interpretation of the comparative evidence on which it relied.
The answer to the first question is that, in the short run, the
supply of caregivers is largely fixed. That means private financing will
redistribute attention to some over others, not increase the availability
of care itself.2 The majority, as Franqois Bland has noted, did not take
' It did prompt the attention of Professor Franqois Band of the University of Montreal in
"The Supreme Court Missed a Good Opportunity" Law and Governance (June 2005), online:
Longwoods Publishing < http://www.longwoods.com/product.php?productid = 17234& page = 1 >.
2 This claim about clarity is not meant to cast doubt on the proposition that there are other
more important constraints on queue-jumping in Canada than the ban in six provinces on private
insurance financing of publicly insured services. See Colleen M. Flood, "Chaoulli's Legacy for the
Future of Canadian Health Care Policy" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 273. In that article, Flood
makes a good case that preventing physicians from working both in the private and the public
sectors is more important. That some other policy promotes the same value does not detract from
the claim that the ban serves the same purpose, even if less powerfully.
27As noted, Time (Canada) published what I wrote on 10 June 2005. Supra note 7.
2 Another good point here is that:
[tihe Court's complete failure to cite, follow, or even attempt to distinguish its own
precedents led it to make a fundamental legal error: it posed the wrong question. The
question was not whether Quebec had convincingly demonstrated that a ban on private
insurance was necessary to maintain the iniegrity of public health insurance. Rather,
2006]
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on the question of how less waiting time for patients like Mr. Zeliotis
could reduce the waiting time of others. Instead, they decided that the
burden of proof was not on the plaintiffs to show that private insurance
"cures" the waiting list problem. Further, as B61and puts it, the court
"completely avoid[ed] examining the possibility that introducing private
insurance would lengthen waiting lists in the public sector., 2
9
The answer to the second question led me to compose months
later the last part of this article. Since I provided testimony, my general
conclusion may be relevant as a considered answer to what the
comparative evidence on health policy demonstrated. In fact, as
Professor Hamish Stewart noted, the trial court relied to some degree
on my report.3 0 As such, it may be useful to simply repeat my conclusion,
cited by the dissent in Chaoulli
Doubts about the plaintiffs assumptions are not only based on
theoretical concerns. There is also considerable empirical basis for such
skepticism. My studies of health care and financing systems in OECD
countries provides real world demonstrations of the dynamics that
might well occur in Canada .... In France, for example, there is
continuous dispute about the role of cost sharing by patients in
restraining demand for services in a fair and effective way. ... The result
is less the reduction of medical care use (whether justified or not), but
the substitution of one source of payment for another. This
multiplication of sources of finance weakens rather than strengthens
the capacity of a society to decide democratically what health care its
citizens should be entitled to in health care and how scarcity should be
apportioned.31
The critique thus far has concentrated on the argument the
majority used to reject expert views that international evidence provided
the question was whether Quebec had a 'reasoned apprehension of harm' that opening
the door to private insurance would pose this threat.
Sujit Choudry, "Worse than Lochner?" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 3, 75 at 86.
29 Supra note 25. This comment was made with reference to Chaoulh supra note 1 at 827,
838.
0 Hamish Stewart, "Implications of Chaoulli for Fact-Finding in Constitutional Cases" in
Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 3, 207 at 211.
3' Theodore R. Marmor, Expert Witness Report (November 1998) at 5 [on file with the
author].
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some support for the Quebec government's ban on supplementary
health insurance. Now I turn to a more fundamental concern: the extent
to which the majority understood how to use comparative evidence at
all.32
What is striking is how cavalier the majority was about how to
evaluate comparative policy analysis. There was almost no attention in
the majority opinion to the logic of comparative analysis or to the limits
of reasoning from such findings. There are but two defensible scholarly
designs of comparative policy studies: a "similar system" and a "most
different system" approach. The more similar the nations selected for
study, the more plausible that the forecasts based on the experiences of
nations A to F would resemble what nation G should expect from a
similar policy initiative. Nothing in the majority's opinion suggested an
awareness of this understanding. Equally, where many different nations
have a common reaction to a given policy, this suggests an especially
powerful reason to anticipate the same result from a new nation
implementing that initiative. Such generalizations will be rare, given the
diversity of national experiences, but will be important for policy
forecasting. The majority in Chaoulliwere silent on the methodology of
using very different systems for comparative analysis. Indeed, in terms
of international comparative evidence, there was no methodological
discussion of any kind. Instead, the majority pontificated about their use
of what they called "studies," especially the comparative findings
published by Senator Kirby in the six-volume report entitled The Health
of Canadians-The Federal Role.33
32 In fact, there are at least four distinct ways of financing health care. Actually, "[dlouble-
cover or complementary private health insurance in Canada is different from alternative private
health insurance in Germany or the Netherlands and from supplementary health insurance [in]
Belgium, France and Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.... [T]he majority of the Supreme
Court fail to grasp this distinction." Grel3, supra note 8 at 291-92.
' Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology,
The Health of Canadians-The Federal Role: The Story So Far (Interim Report), vol. 1 (Ottawa:
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 2001) (Chair: Michael J.L.
Kirby); Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The
Health of Canadians-The Federal Role: Current Trends and Future Challenges (Interim Report),
vol. 2 (Ottawa: Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 2002)
(Chair: Michael J.L. Kirby); Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science
and Technology, The Health of Canadians-The Federal Role: Health Care Systems in Other
Countries (Interim Report), vol. 3 (Ottawa: Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and
Technology, 2002) (Chair: Michael J.L. Kirby); Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social
Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians-The Federal Role: Issues and Options
2006]
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Before turning to the use of the report's findings, it would be
helpful to briefly review the criticism others have made of the Court's
analysis of the comparative evidence. Professor Colleen Flood argues
that the majority in Chaoullidid not understand the different forms and
functions of private health insurance abroad, and further, that they
failed to recognize that other regimes possessed functional substitutes
for Canada's ban on private insurance for publicly financed medical
services.34 This claim is certainly true and important. Professor Flood
also makes a different and contestable claim by questioning whether the
Quebec Charteis ban is even the most significant instrument of control
on private medical care in Canada. Other scholars applaud the minority
opinion that, unlike the trial court, the Court was not in a position to
reconsider international evidence. They call attention to the limited
time the Court had for a hearing, the inappropriate inclusion of
evidence not central to the trial court's deliberations, and the
condescending treatment of the experts that were cross-examined at
trial. I want to note, but not comment further on any of these
arguments, however much I find them compelling.
The central decision facing the Court about comparative
evidence was whether it should defer to the trial court's evidentiary
findings, which embodied conclusions of all but one of the expert
witnesses. Precisely what evidence, then, did they use? The answer is,
not much. The majority relied on the work of the Kirby Report, but that
in turn raises the issue of whether it was worthy of reliance. In fact, the
(Interim Report), vol. 4 (Ottawa: Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology,
2002) (Chair: Michael J.L. Kirby); Canada, The Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs,
Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians-The Federal Role: Principles and
Recommendations for Reform-Part I (Interim Report), vol. 5 (Ottawa: Senate Committee on
Social Affairs, Science and Technology, 2002) (Chair: Michael J.L. Kirby); and Canada, The
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, The Health of Canadians-
The Federal Role: Recommendations for Reform (Interim Report), vol. 6 (Ottawa: Senate
Committee on Social Affairs,. Science and Technology, 2002) (Chair: Michael J.L. Kirby) [irby
Report.
.4 Supra note 26. Others have pointed out the distributive features of double insurance
coverage and the advantages it confers on private providers of care: "The summary of world
experience with private health insurance; then, is that where it exists it functions primarily as a
mechanism for providing preferred access to care-shorter waiting times and particularly specialist
services-for those with higher incomes. It is also a source of additional income for the providers
who serve, and are paid, by that clientele." Robert G. Evans, "Preserving Privilege, Promoting
Profit: The Payoffs from Private Health Insurance" in Flood, Roach & Sossin, supra note 3, 347 at
365.
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report's review of the experience of other industrial democracies with
universal access to medical care was rather superficial.35 The Senate
Committee responsible for the repo.rt put together snippets of
information into short national portraits of the United Kingdom,
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Australia, Sweden, and the United
States. Those short portraits are typical of a class of studies that
substitute superficial description for substantial understanding of how
complex policy systems actually work. Moreover, the Senate Committee
complemented this superficial treatment with what can only be
described as rudimentary reflections on the accuracy of their portraits.
They held video conferences with a series of national experts, talking by
telephone and then recording their conclusions about how the experts'
systems worked. As an alternative to knowing nothing about the
experience of other nations, this is admirable. As serious analysis of
comparative performance of quite different regimes, this is totally
inadequate.
It is fair to note, on the other hand, that reliable comparative
policy studies in this field are rare. Much of what passes for comparative
understanding are hit-and-run observations communicated by phone,
fax, and lightning visits. 36 But that does not absolve the majority from
criticism for using weak studies to draw strong conclusions. Put another
way, the Kirby Report provides little authority in two senses: (1) the
bases for the Senate Committee's deliberations were, as stated,
superficial; and (2) the majority invoked the Kirby Report even though
the report did not reach the same conclusion as the majority did about
the implications of international experience for Canadian reform.
The Kirby Reports approach to comparative policy learning is a
poster child example of what not to do. 37 According to the majority,
3 Note the supporting interpretation by Colleen M. Flood and Steven Lewis: "Through
their comparative analysis of health care systems, [the maj6rity] amply demonstrate[s] why courts
should be extremely cautious about wading into these difficult policy choices." "Courting Trouble:
The Supreme Court's Embrace of Private Health Insurance" (2005) 1 Healthcare Pol'y 26 at 28.
36 Richard Freeman, Ted Marmor & Kieke Okma, "Comparative Perspectives and Policy
Learning in the World of Health Care" (2005) 7 J. Comp. Pol'y Analysis 331.
37 For instance, consider the Senate Committee's claim that "[a] number of health trends
that affect young people in Canada are of great concern. These include, for example, overweight
and obesity, eating disorders, incidence of smoking, illiteracy and low levels of psychological well-
being" in Kirby Report, vol. 4, supra note 33 at 35. This is sufficiently vague that it could apply to
any industrial democracy in the world, a commonsensical observation that has no obvious policy
implication.
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however, the report "discussed in detail the situations in several
countries, including Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom" '38 and
that supposedly provided the grounds for substantial cross-national
policy learning. In fact, the sketches of the financing and administration
of health care in Sweden, Germany, and the United Kingdom had no
coherent rationale. Nor did the findings about how these systems
appeared to operate rest on convincing sources of evidence. The Kirby
Report represented nothing more than a review of the published
literature on the formal features of these national schemes, and it
sought to arrive at a more nuanced understanding by video conference
discussion with a limited set of national experts. How that is an
improvement on the expert reports-and trial cross-examination of
those experts-is a mystery, at least to me.
Further, the majority proceeded from the evidence in the Kirby
Report to a conclusion about the reform of medicare that was not
reflected in the Committee's conclusions. The report's international
discussion was surely superficial, but they did not draw from such
portraits reform conclusions. The majority, by contrast, used (or
misused) the international evidence in their justificatory argument.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this article was to evaluate the Chaoulli decision
from the standpoint of a scholar of comparative studies in health care
reasonably familiar with Canadian medicare developments over the past
four decades. With regard to the majority's use of international
experience in reaching its conclusions, my conclusion is three-fold. First,
the approach to posing comparative policy questions was obtuse, ill-
considered, and prejudicial. Second, the majority had no defensible
grounds for its conclusions other than the assertion that the findings of
the Kirby Report confirmed their a priori beliefs. Third, the Senate
38 Supra note 1 at 855. It is useful to contrast the Court's appeal to the authority of the
Senate Committee's "findings" about other national experiences with their cavalier dismissal of
""common sense" arguments, amounting to little more than assertions of belief." (Ibid. at 852). If
the Senate Committee findings were descriptive portraits that did not constitute evidence for the
conclusions drawn, they hardly warrant such treatment. Nor is there support for the remarkable
claim that "the experience of these countries suggests that there is no real connection in fact
between prohibition of health insurance and the goal of a quality public health system." (Ibid.).
How could that conclusion be drawn from mere descriptive portraits of a number of countries
where the impact of private health insurance was not the focus of the investigation?
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Committee's findings in the report were largely descriptions of financial
and administrative arrangement, not the product of a research design
structured to discover the effects of private health insurance on medical
care systems where double coverage is proposed.
Whatever one's preference for what the Court should have
done, it is crucial to concentrate on what it failed to do correctly, as the
Court is likely to be taking up cases of this kind in the future. Not only
did it reveal massive ignorance of the conventions of comparative
scholarship, but the Court also appears to have engaged in what some
people term "decision-based evidence": the opinion seems to have
preceded the analysis. These critical assessments, then, are directed
towards cautioning those who might turn to the Chaoulli decision for
guidance on what cross-national research on medical care might offer
Canadian jurisprudence.

